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Abstract. Good decision making depends on having accurate information—quickly,
and in a form in which it can be readily communicated and acted upon. Two fea-
tures of medical practice can help: deliberation in groups and the use of scores and
grades in evaluation. We study the contributions of these features using a multi-
agent computer simulation of groups of physicians. One might expect individual
differences in members’ grading standards to reduce the capacity of the group to
discover the facts on which well-informed decisions depend. Observations of the
simulated groups suggest on the contrary that this kind of diversity can in fact be
conducive to epistemic performance. Sometimes, it is adopting common standards
that may be expected to result in poor decisions.
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1 Introduction
It has long been known that collecting together inputs from several people can
increase the probability of correct decisions and the accuracy of judgments (Con-
dorcet 1785, Galton 1907). More recently, it has become clear that including differ-
ent perspectives and ways of thinking within the group can be just as important
as individual expertise (Surowiecki 2004, Page 2008). These insights provide an
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epistemological rationale for much practice that has evolved in medicine, where
knowledge is pieced together in morning reports, case conferences, peer to peer
consultations, and in other meetings and discussions among staff. Improvements
in the quality and efficiency of healthcare may be expected to result from increased
reliance on collective intelligence in medicine (Wolf et al. 2015).
Scores and grades play a central part in medical evaluation. For example, Wells
and Geneva scores are used in clinical medicine to determine pre-test probabili-
ties for pulmonary embolism, expressed in the qualitative probability grades low,
intermediate, and high (Wells et al. 1998, Wicki et al. 2001; decisions about further
diagnostic testing depend on the outcome.1 Following the GRADE method, sys-
tematic review panels categorize bodies of evidence as high, moderate, low or very
low in quality (Balshem et al. 2011). From Apgar scoring of newborn babies (Finster
and Wood 2005) to the Glasgow Coma Scale used to identify organ donors (Teas-
dale and Jennett 1974), scores and grades express many different aspects of health
throughout our lives.
Using grades and other qualitative language brings an important advantage
when decisions are made under pressure of time. It’s not possible to know, say, ex-
actly what the probability is that a patient who’s just come into the emergency room
has a pulmonary embolism. That’s not necessary, though, in order to judge that the
probability is high, or intermediate, or low, and to decide on that basis whether di-
agnostic procedures such as a CT scan, a chest x-ray or blood tests will be carried
out. The reason is just that qualitative probabilities are coarse grained, each covering
a range of precise probabilities. There would appear to be drawbacks to grading as
well, though. One is that expressions such as high, intermediate and low can mean
different things to different people. Large differences between doctors and their
patients have been documented in the medical literature (see for instance Ohnishi
et al. 2002). Similar differences were found among members of a science panel in
the Netherlands (Wardekker et al. 2008), and among students of business and the
social sciences (Figure 1, Morgan 2014).
One solution to problems arising from different interpretations of grades is to
establish standard grading procedures for people to use. Take for instance the
Geneva and Wells rules for determining pre-test probabilities. They require scoring
1A pre-test probability is the subjective probability that a patient has some given condition, before
a diagnostic test result is available.
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less comfortable with such formulations. For
example, some years ago, my colleagues and
I conducted an expert elicitation among a
group of different types of health experts in
an effort to gain insight about health damages
that could result from chronic exposure to
submicron sulfate air pollution. One of our
experts, an inhalation toxicologist, tried re-
peatedly to answer our questions to provide a
subjective probability distribution on the slope
of a health damage function, but simply could
not bring himself to provide such answers. After
framing our questions in several different ways,
and always reaching an impasse, we suspended
the elicitation. Some days later the expert came
back to us saying he had been thinking about it,
that the questions we had been asking made
sense, and that he wanted to try again. However,
when we did that, he once again found that he
could not bring himself to make the necessary
quantitative judgments. Although this may be
an extreme case, I believe that it also reflects a
broader difference among fields.
Fifteen years ago, the Presidential/Congres-
sional Commission onRiskAssessment andRisk
Management (29), almost all of whose members
were medical professionals, argued that natural
scientists should provide probabilistic assess-
ments of exposures, and economists should
provide probabilistic assessments of damages,
but that health experts should provide only a
deterministic treatment of the health damage
functions associated with environmental expo-
sures. This reticence to engage in making quan-
titative subjective judgments has led some to
draw an overly sharp distinction between vari-
ability and uncertainty—with the claim that only
the former should be described in terms of
distributions (i.e., with histograms). Although
there are certainly situations in which it is
important to distinguish variability from un-
certainty, there are also many decision con-
texts in which distinguishing between the two
simply adds unnecessary complication.
Qualitative Uncertainty Words Are Not
Sufficient
There is clear evidence that without some
quantification, the use of qualitative words such
as “likely” and “unlikely” to describe uncertainty
can mask important, often critical, differences
between the views of different experts. The
problem arises because the same words can
mean very different things to different people, as
well as different things to the same person in
different contexts. Fig. 1 summarizes the range
of quantitative values that respondents attached
to various probability words, independent of
any specific context, in a study conducted by
Wallsten et al. (30). Wardekker et al. (31) re-
port similar findings in more recent studies
undertaken in The Netherlands to improve the
communication of uncertainty in results from
environmental assessments. Fig. 2 summarizes
the range of quantitative values that members
of the EPA Science Advisory Board attached to
probability words used to describe the likeli-
hood that a chemical agent is a human car-
cinogen. Such results make a compelling case
for at least some quantification when assessing
the value of uncertain coefficients or the like-
lihood of uncertain events. The climate assess-
ment community has taken this lesson seriously,
providing mappings of probability words into
quantitative values in most assessment reports
(34–36).
Cognitive Heuristics and Bias
We humans are not equipped with a competent
mental statistical processor. Rather, in making
judgments in the face of uncertainty, we un-
consciously use a variety of cognitive heuristics.
As a consequence, when asked to make prob-
abilistic judgments, either in a formal elicitation
or in any less formal setting, people’s judgments
are often biased. Two of the cognitive heuristics
that are most relevant to expert elicitation are
called “availability” and “anchoring and adjust-
ment.” These heuristics have been extensively
studied by Tversky and Kahneman (37, 38).
Through the operation of availability, people
assess the frequency of a class, or the probability
of an event, by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind. In per-
forming elicitation, the objective should be to
obtain an expert’s carefully considered judg-
ment based on a systematic consideration of all
relevant evidence. For this reason one should
take care to adopt strategies designed to help the
expert being interviewed to avoid overlooking
relevant evidence.
When presented with an estimation task, if
people start with a first value (i.e., an anchor)
and then adjust up and down from that
value, they typically do not adjust sufficiently.
Kahneman and Tversky call this second heu-
ristic “anchoring and adjustment” (37, 38). To
minimize the influence of this heuristic when
eliciting probability distributions, it is standard
procedure not to begin with questions that ask
about “best” or most probable values but rather
to first ask about extremes: “What is the highest
(lowest) value you can imagine for coefficient
X?” or “Please give me a value for coefficient X
for which you think there is only one chance in
100 that actual value could be larger (smaller).”
Having obtained an estimate of an upper
(lower) bound, it is then standard practice to
ask the expert to imagine that the uncertainty
about the coefficient’s value has been resolved
and the actual value has turned out to be 10%
or 15% larger (smaller) than the bound they
offered. We then ask the expert, “Can you offer
Fig. 1. The range of numerical probabilities that re-
spondents attached to qualitative probability words in the
absence of any specific context are shown. Note the very
wide ranges of probability that were associated with some
of these words. Figure redrawn from Wallsten et al. (30).
Fig. 2. Results obtained by Morgan (32) when mem-
bers of the Executive Committee of the EPA Science
Advisory Board were asked to assign numerical proba-
bilities to uncertainty words that had been proposed for
use with EPA cancer guidelines (33). Note that even in
this relatively small and expert group, the minimum
probability associated with the word “likely” spans 4
orders of magnitude, the maximum probability associ-
ated with the word “not likely” spans more than 5 orders
of magnitude, and there is an overlap of the probabilities
the different experts associated with the two words.







Figure 1: Reproduced from Morgan 2014.
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patients on relevant criteria, and then adding up the scores to determine which
grade applies (Torbicki et al. 2008, Table 7). Using the GRADE method, bodies
of evidence are categorized initially on the basis of study design, and then up- or
down-graded according to relevant strengths or weaknesses of the study, such as
large effect size, or a serious risk of bias (Balshem et al. 2011, Table 3).
Another approach is to stipulate explicit definitions of grading expressions. In
some cases it is possible to specify precise thresholds for applicability, as the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has done for the qualitative proba-
bility grades used in its publications (Mastrandrea et al. 2011). With a multi-faceted
notion such as quality of evidence it is not straightforward to specify thresholds.
However, it is possible to characterize grades in ordinary language. For example,
the GRADE working group specifies that moderate quality evidence means:
We are moderately confident in the effect estimate: The true effect is
likely to be close to the estimate of the effect, but there is a possibility
that it is substantially different. (Balshem et al. 2011, Table 2)
Arguably these methods can be effective in establishing and maintaining common
grading standards. Inter-rater reliability studies tend to confirm this (Mustafa et al.
2013, Iles et al. 2003). The potential benefits are obvious. Following standard proto-
cols makes decisions transparent. Also, having everybody “on the same page” helps
people to communicate the knowledge on which good decision-making depends.
Grading standards are conventional. In the end, it’s completely up to us, say,
just which precise probabilities will count as low, which as intermediate, and which
as high. We argue, though, that they are not merely conventional, in that which
standards we settle on can greatly affect our ability to obtain knowledge and make
good decisions.2 Indeed, we argue, some standards are actually harmful, in that a
group that has adopted them will be worse at “tracking the truth”, even, than a
group whose members could have any understandings at all of what the applicable
grades mean. Furthermore, we argue, which standards are better than which, and
which standards are harmful, can be hard to tell. This is because it can turn on the
nature of the facts that are to be discovered. For example, when these concern the
pre-test probabilities of several disorders that a patient might have, it can turn on
2Similarly, legal speed limits are not merely conventional. They have consequences for public safety,
levels of pollution and the efficiency of our transport system. It’s different with a simple matter of
coordination such as which side of the road we drive on.
4
what these probabilities happen in fact to be.
The capacity of a group to discover facts naturally depends on much more than
just its conventions about language and the nature of these facts. The level of ex-
pertise of individual group members also matters. So does the size of the group.
To help us study complex interactions between these and other factors we have
built a computer model. It simulates a group with the task of ranking some given
possibilities in order of their probability, on the basis of opinions expressed by indi-
vidual group members using qualitative probability grades. The group’s epistemic
performance in this task is reckoned as the frequency with which an event that the
group judges to be be most probable really is that; and by setting different parame-
ters we can observe the consequences of the group’s adopting various conventions
about the meaning of the grades in which individual inputs are expressed. These
observations are the basis for our claims about the epistemic merits and demerits
of grading standards.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 explains our model of grading in groups and
certain assumptions of its implementation. Section 3 compares the performance of
simulated groups of graders working with different grading standards. Section 4
summarizes the conclusions we draw from these results.
2 The Model
We mentioned in the previous section the importance in medicine of scoring and
grading by groups. In this section, we focus on a simple and idealized exam-
ple from clinical medicine. First we build a model of this example, based on the
Arrow-Sen framework in social choice theory (Arrow 1951, Sen 1970). Then we
study the model with the aid of computer simulations. An important innovation
is that our model includes the language of grades in which individual people ex-
press their judgments, along with their interpretations of this language. Taking
interpretations of language into account is necessary for a proper understanding of
collective decisions more generally, not just in the present medical context (Morreau
and Weymark 2016).
First, let us introduce the example we have in mind. We imagine a set of three
physicians: Brown, Jones and Smith, and a patient who presents with a set of
symptoms: chest pains and shortness of breath. There is a set of possible disorders:
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(H) the patient has hyperventilation, or (HA) is having a heart attack, or (P) has
pneumonia, or (PE) has a pulmonary embolism, or.... The physicians are to rank
the different ones, on the basis of the available information, in order of their pre-test
probabilities.3 Their goal—in this simple and idealized example—is to identify the
disorder with the highest pre-test probability.4
We now describe a mathematical model of this simple kind of case. Let N
be the set of physicians, e.g.: N = {Brown, Jones, Smith}, and D be the set of
disorders to consider, e.g.: D = {d1, d2, ..., dn}. Since the physicians will evaluate
these diagnoses using a using a grading language, we have to specify the details
of this language. There are three components to a grading language, L = (G,
, Ii). The first component, G, is the set of grades that the physicians will use. For
example, we might have:
G = {high,medium, low}.
The second component of the language, , is a linear ordering of the grades. For
example, a natural linear ordering of the above grades would be: high  medium 
low.
The third component In is the one we have most to say about here. In is an
interpretation function for individual physician n ∈ N of the grades in G. It assigns
to each g ∈ G this individual’s interpretation of g. For example, IBrown might be the
function:
IBrown(high) = [66%, 100%]
IBrown(medium) = [33%, 66%)
IBrown(low) = [0%, 33%)
Intuitively, In tells us how individual n understands the different available grades.
In the above example, physician Brown understands the probability grade high to
3The pre-test probability P(D+) of a disorder is understood here to be the proportion D+/(D+ +
D−) of patients with this disorder among all those with this particular patient’s symptoms.
4We assume that identifying the most probable condition is relevant to medical decision making.
Sometimes it certainly is: in determining the Wells score for PE, for instance, physicians are expected
to determine whether PE is the most probable diagnosis—or, anyway, whether it is at least as likely
as any other (Wells et al. 1998). In general perhaps it is more important instead to identify those
possibilities that require immediate action; for now, though, we assume that what matters is simply
probability.
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correspond to the range of pre-test probabilities from 66% to 100%. Of course,
different individuals may have different interpretations of the grades. For example,
Jones might interpret the grades as follows:
IJones(high) = [90%, 100%]
IJones(medium) = [10%, 90%)
IJones(low) = [0%, 10%)
If Im = In = I , for every m, n ∈ N, then I is called a consensus interpretation.
Intuitively, if there is a consensus interpretation, then everyone in the group has
the same understanding of what the grades mean. Such a consensus may arise
naturally or it may arise because the physicians have been given explicit instruction
to use a particular interpretation.
In real situations, physicians often (but not always) use scoring systems, such
as the Wells and Geneva systems, to assign grades to possible diagnoses. We could
model these systems explicitly. Instead we take a more general approach that ab-
stracts away from the details of whatever scoring system or other process it is by
which physicians assign probability grades. We think of it like this: physicians are
presented with some information, i. It includes the patient’s symptoms, medical
history and so on. For each disorder d, they convert this information i into a cor-
responding grade g. Mathematically, we can think of this process as the following
mapping:
(i, d) −→ g
This mapping might be instantiated via a scoring system that the physician has
been instructed to use or it might be instantiated by some other process — e.g., the
physician might make an intuitive judgment of i and d to assign grade g.
In order to have a model that we can study systematically, we now add some
details. First, we assume that i and d together fix some objectively correct pre-
test probability p ∈ [0, 1]. Second, we introduce the notion of an individual point
estimate. The idea is that for any given individual n there is some noisy process
that turns p into n’s estimate e thereof. For simplicity, we assume this process is
an unbiased Gaussian with variance σ2 (i.e. a normal distribution or ”bell curve”).
Third, we assume that e is then converted to the appropriate grade g, according to
n’s interpretation In. For example, if e = 5% and we use Jones’ above interpretation,
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then the grade Jones assigns to the disorder in question is low. The model, then,
can be thought of as the following sequence of mappings:
(i, d) −→ p −→ e −→ g
Note that we do not assume that n is aware of e or actually constructs e in any
conscious way. Indeed, we think that in many situations this is rather unlikely
(scoring systems typically do not mention point probabilities). Instead, we take
the above to be an abstract model of individual grading. As such, e is a theoretical
parameter that we use to generalize across many different ways of moving from
(i, d) to g, including the use of scoring rules and other protocols that make no
reference to point probabilities or estimates.
Based on this noisy process and the individual interpretations of the grades, the
individuals assign grades to each of the disorders. Each individual then selects the
disorder they give the highest grade. (We must allow for the possibility that several
disorders get the top grade. For example, Brown might think that both pneumonia
and pulmonary embolism are high probabilities. In such situations, we assume
that ties are broken by randomly selecting from the top grade category.) Either the
individual’s selection is correct, being at the top of the objective ordering, or else it
is not. The individual’s expected performance is, by definition, the proportion of cases
in which their selection is correct, within a large number of trials.
So far we have been busy with individual judgments. However, we are inter-
ested the judgments of the group. These are gotten by aggregating the individually
assigned grades. Different procedures can be used for this. Here we follow the
simple method of taking the median or middlemost of the individually assigned
grades: the grades assigned to d by the different i ∈ N are first listed in order of
 (including repetitions, when several have assigned the same grade). Assuming
the number of N is odd, the collective grade for d is the one that’s in the middle of
the list. If N is even, the collective grade for d is randomly selected from the two
grades in the middle of the list.5
The group chooses the disorder to which it gives the highest grade. (Again, ties
are broken by random selection.) Either the group’s selection is correct, in that this
disorder really is one of those with the highest pre-test probability, or else it is not.
5One advantage of making decisions in groups is that people’s positions change in light of group
discussion. By simply aggregating the individually assigned grades we leave this important aspect of
deliberation to one side. Modeling it is a promising line for future work of the sort begun here.
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The group’s expected performance is, by definition, the proportion of cases in which
its selection is correct, within a large number of trials.
In this paper we focus on individual interpretations of the probability expres-
sions. Would it be good for the group to have a single common interpretation—a
semantic consensus, as we will call it? If so, which semantic consensus will be best,
in the sense that it is most favorable for determining pre-test probabilities? Even
in our simple example, this depends in complicated ways on multiple factors. In
order to answer such questions as these we take up a tool that is often used to study
complex social interactions: multi-agent computer simulation (Epstein 2007). That
requires making further modeling assumptions, to which we now turn.
For one thing, we need an assumption about how the pre-test probabilities of
the different possible disorders are distributed. We don’t assume the disorders are
mutually exclusive: a patient can have several of them at once. For simplicity, and
for some degree of realism, we assume that the pre-test probabilities are distributed
according to a Pareto distribution, αxα/xα+1, where α is a parameter that we can
vary in the simulations.6 For each simulation run of our model, a distribution of
30 pre-test probabilities is generated from a Pareto sample, the individuals then
grade the diagnoses according to the model described above with σ2 = 10%, and
then their performance is assessed in terms of how often they choose disorders
with the highest pre-test probability. Finally, the group grades are determined by
aggregating the individual grades and the group performance is then also assessed
in terms of how often it chooses the most probable disorders. Performance scores
are averaged over 2,000 simulation runs.
Regarding the grades and interpretations, we assume that the physicians have 3
grades available to them (this is realistic: many real scoring and grading protocols
use from 2 to 4). And in our simulations, we focus on the three kinds of consensus
interpretations and one non-consensus set of interpretations:
1. A symmetric consensus interpretation with thresholds of [33, 66, 100]. (That is,
individuals with this consensus interpret low as [0, 33], medium as [33, 66], and
high as [66, 100].)
2. A bottom-heavy consensus interpretation with thresholds of [25, 50, 100].
6With a Pareto distribution, the different diagnoses can be “bunched up” at the bottom, with many
improbable ones and only a few that are likely. See for example figure 2. Smaller values of α make
more diagnoses more likely.
9
3. A top-heavy consensus interpretation with thresholds of [50, 75, 100].
4. A random set of interpretations, where each individual has thresholds [a, b, 100],
where a and b are generated by randomly selecting uniformly from the (0, 100)
interval.
Our goal is not to study every possible interpretation, but rather to demonstrate
how the performance associated with a particular consensus can depend dramati-
cally on the details of the situation at hand. Similarly, although we’ve made many
precise and idealising assumptions — e.g., that the pre-test probabilities are ap-
proximately Pareto — our goal is to show how the performance associated with a
particular consensus is highly context sensitive. The upshot then is that when we
are designing scoring and grade systems, we need to think carefully about what
kinds of situations they are going to employed in, and that computer simulations
can help us with this task.
3 Results
We studied 2,000 simulation runs of the model described in the previous section for
two parameter settings of the Pareto distribution from which the pre-test probabili-
ties are sampled: α = 3 and α = 20. These are summarised in figures 2 and 3. Recall
that smaller values of α make more disorders more likely. So we have effectively
studied two kinds of situations: one in which the vast majority of disorders are
unlikely (α = 20) and one in which several disorders tend to have a pre-test proba-
bility greater than 50% and some are even quite likely, with probabilities above 80%
(α = 3).
In the first kind of situation (figure 2), the bottom-heavy consensus — i.e., the
”[25,50,100]” consensus — gives rise to the best performance (for both individu-
als and groups) and the top-heavy consensus — i.e., the ”[50,75,100]” consensus
— gives rise to the worst performance (again, for both individuals and groups).
However, in the second kind of situation (figure 3), the exact reverse occurs: the
top-heavy consensus gives rise to the best performance (for both individuals and
groups) and the bottom-heavy consensus gives rise to the worst performance (again,
for both individuals and groups). This reason is as follows. In the first kind of sit-
uation, the bottom-heavy consensus makes more distinctions where most of the
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Figure 2: Performances of different interpretations for individuals (green) and
groups (blue) for a Pareto distribution of pre-test probabilities with a = 20. Er-
ror bars are 95% confidence intervals based on 2,000 simulation runs.
Figure 3: Performances of different interpretations for individuals (green) and
groups (blue) for a Pareto distribution of pre-test probabilities with a = 3. Error
bars are 95% confidence intervals based on 2,000 simulation runs.
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pre-test probabilities are — see the example distribution of the pre-test probabili-
ties in the figure 2). And, in the second situation, the top-heavy consensus makes
more distinctions where they matter: where the very likely pre-test probabilities are
— see the example distribution of the pre-test probabilities in the figure 3).
This reversal demonstrates just how sensitive the performance associated with a
particular consensus can be. The only difference between the two kinds of situations
is the variation of the parameter α from 20 to 3. In real life, situations will vary in
many more — and much more complicated — ways.
In both situations, some semantic consensus resulted in worse epistemic per-
formance than random interpretations: in figure 2, the top-heavy consensus was
worse; in figure 3, the bottom-heavy consensus was. This suggests that if time and
energy are to be spent on forming a semantic consensus, it is important to think
carefully about which it will be. Otherwise, it might well be better simply to let
everyone interpret the grades as they please. Surprisingly, perhaps, letting people
understand the applicable grades any old how can result in better performance than
reaching a common understanding.
In both situations we see collective wisdom effects — that is, group perfor-
mance tended to be better than individual performance — but they are small. This
is mostly because the group of physicians was assumed to be small, with just three
members, and because the noise associated with the process of generating the hypo-
thetical estimates was fairly low (σ2 = 10%). Clearer differences between individual
and group performance can be observed with more noise (e.g., σ2 = 30%) and a
larger group (e.g., |N| = 10). This is demonstrated in figure 4.
In the cases we have looked at so far, there is always a consensus interpretation
that performs better than the symmetric consensus. However, by changing some of
the assumptions of our model we find situations in which the symmetric consensus
performs best (of the interpretations we discuss here). For example, changing the
underlying distribution of pre-test probabilities to a Gaussian, with a mean of 50%
and a variance of 10%, and reducing the number of possible disorders from 30 to
10 (figure 5), we observe that the symmetric consensus performs better than the
other consensus interpretations and random interpretations. Again, we see how
the relative performance of a consensus interpretation is sensitive to the details of
the situation at hand.
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Figure 4: Performances of different interpretations for individuals (green) and
groups (blue) for a Pareto distribution of pre-test probabilities with a = 3, nois-
ier physicians (σ2 = 30%) and more physicians (|N| = 10). Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals based on 2,000 simulation runs.
Figure 5: Performances of different interpretations for individuals (green) and
groups (blue) for a Gaussian distribution with mean 50% and variance 10% and
10 possible disorders being evaluated by the physicians. Error bars are 95% confi-
dence intervals based on 2,000 simulation runs.
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4 Summary and discussion
People often find it easier to grade, and to communicate with others in qualitative
terms, rather than to use more rigorous language. In order to avoid interpersonal
differences in the interpretation of grades, steps can be taken to standardize us-
age. These include the use of scoring and grading protocols, and providing explicit
definitions of the relevant expressions.
We showed using a computer simulation that, from an epistemological view-
point, some standards are better than others in some contexts and worse in others.
Simulated individuals and groups with the epistemically better standards are bet-
ter at discovering relevant facts. Importantly, some standards can result in rather
poor performance, in that a group having adapted them may be expected to be less
capable of discovering facts, even, than a group of people whose members could in-
terpret the grades in any way at all. (This can be seen in figures 2 and 3, where the
performances of random interpretations were better than top-heavy and bottom-
heavy interpretations, respectively.) Furthermore, and crucially, which standards
lead to better performance than which, and whether adopting any given standards
would help the group or hurt it, is highly contextual. In the case we considered
here, it depends, among many other things, on what the probabilities of the given
disorders happen to be.
Our model of individual and collective grading is simple. Surely some of its
assumptions and idealizations will be found unrealistic. The task we analyzed,
choosing the most-probable disorder from among several, is also simple. A more
important task, perhaps, is choosing the disorder with the highest expected danger,
since although such disorders might be relatively unlikely they can require imme-
diate action given their high-level of danger. Since some disorders with substantial
danger are more likely than others, this should have a significant impact on the
performances associated with different grading standards. With multi-dimensional
tasks there is also further scope for interpersonal differences and for standardiza-
tion, since in addition to having different thresholds people can attach different
weights and priorities to the several dimensions. There is much work to be done
before our simulation studies cover any large part of real medical practice.
Be this as it may, the results already point to the contribution that computa-
tional studies can make. Scores, grades and other qualitative language are used
throughout medicine, for estimating probabilities, evaluating evidence and more.
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Our simulations show not only that different ways of standardizing such language
can have very different consequences for performance, but also that many other
factors are relevant, all interacting in complicated and sometimes unintuitive ways.
Introducing computational studies and statistical analysis into the development of
scoring and grading systems may be expected to help researchers to think through
the consequences of basic design decisions such as how many grades to use, how
many people are needed for expert panels to be effective and what the required lev-
els of expertise are—before their decisions become established in medical practice.
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